Inside Unmanned Systems

DEC 2018 - JAN 2019

Inside Unmanned Systems provides actionable business intelligence to decision-makers and influencers operating within the global UAS community. Features include analysis of key technologies, policy/regulatory developments and new product design.

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12  December 2018/January 2019 unmanned systems inside by James Poss, Maj Gen (Ret.) USAF General Overview that in law? There was some talk of type certifications for classes of op- erations beyond Part 107 (beyond- line-of-sight f lights, operations over people, etc.) but it wasn't serious. ASSURE made sure it got in to study the consensus standards. THE WINNE RS: A SSUR E and sUAS manufacturers. THE LOSERS: No one. Everyone agreed on this issue. SEC. 364. U.S. COUNTER-UAS (C-UAS) SYSTEM REVIEW OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION PROCESSES FAA has 60 days to start reviewing and 180 days to deliver a report on how the Administration coordinates C-UAS activity and what standards are used to protect the NAS, people and property from rogue UAS with- out interfering with the avionics of legally operating aircraft or air traf- fic control systems. The report must state how the administration assess- es C-UAS system standards, how the interagency process works for C-UAS and whether the administration needs additional C-UAS authorities. THE ISSUES: This is the start of a cavalcade of counter UAS support. Congress is dead serious about getting a working counter UAS system in this country and they're making sure the administration knows it. I hope the FAA takes advantage of this report to state exactly what they need to defend the NAS from rogue drones. TH E W I N N E R S: C -UA S UA S s y s t em s m a nu f a c t u r er s , DHS , Department of Justice (DOJ) and FA A. The commercial drone lobby also supports increased counter UAS authorities because they, too, want remote ID for everyone and view C-UAS UAS as a forcing issue. THE LOSERS: The terrorists and a small group of drone users who think the feds will use increased counter UAS authorities to restrict consumer drone activity. SEC. 366. STRATEGY FOR RESPONDING TO PUBLIC SAFETY THREATS AND ENFORCEMENT UTILITY OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FAA has one year to develop a com- prehensive strategy that provides guidance to state and local authori- ties on how to respond to public safe- ty threats from drones and how to use drones to enhance the effective- ness of first responders. The FAA has 180 days to put this info on a website. THE ISSUES: A congressional re- minder that the feds must team with their state, local and tribal partners in the C-UAS battle. There is no such thing as an Air Police Force for the FA A and the FA A can never hope to counter all drone public safety threats across the nation; they need help from local law enforcement. Good to see Congress knows too. THE WINNERS: State, local and trib- al law enforcement and common sense. THE LOSERS: No one. SEC. 44810. AIRPORT SAFETY AND AIRSPACE HAZARD MITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT The FAA must develop a plan to cer- tify, permit and authorize C-UAS systems. The FA A must set up an av iation r ulemak ing committee (ARC) to make recommendations and test C-UAS at five airports, in- cluding one top 10 passenger board- ing airport. Airport sponsors can buy certified counter UAS systems using the Airports Improvement Program funding (AIP). The plan cannot del- egate C-UAS authority to other fed- eral, state, local, territorial, or tribal agencies, or an airport sponsor. The Aircraft Sabotage Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, the Wiretap Act and the Pen/ Trap Statute, shall not apply to FAA counter UAS activities. THE ISSUES: I had to take a knee after reading this section. It has everything the FAA needs to launch an effective C-UAS system to protect our nation's airports. Allowing airport sponsors to use AIP to buy C-UAS is a huge ad- vancement and provides airports a solid C-UAS funding mechanism for C-UAS. The biggest thing in this section—drum roll please—gives the FAA authority to jam drone data links, shoot down rogue drones, hack into their systems and lo- cate drones via their cellular communi- cations. Wow. The only thing I don't agree with in the provision is they can't delegate au- thority to local authorities. It makes sense not to delegate to locals if we're just talking about airport and con- trolled airspace C-UAS operations. I'm assuming critical infrastructure C-UAS will fall to DHS, where some delegation to local, or even commer- cial, authorities make sense. States' lists of critical infrastructure will al- ways differ from the federal list and states should be authorized to defend infrastructure, gatherings or person- nel they deem important. Although the feds genuinely like the governor of Texas, they will never take his safe- ty as seriously as the Texas Rangers. It's the same for state courthouses, judges, prisons, state police loca- tions, etc. There's lots of state stuff to defend that the feds can never get to.

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